A Chavrusa in Latent Space
When o1 chaps the Rogatchover
In March of this year, I wrote about the implications of advances in AI religion and specifically on the topic of Limud Torah (Torah Study) in the Jewish world. You can read that piece here.
Since then, the pace of AI innovation has been quite astonishing. In AI world, weeks can feel like years of progress. Among these advancements, one is particularly relevant to our discussion: the emergence of reasoning-heavy AI models. For those in the know, that would be OpenAI’s “o” series of models or Anthropic’s “Opus” series. (Here is OpenAI’s September release of o1-preview, their first public reasoning model, and here is the December video release of their latest o3 model.)
Unlike earlier LLM’s, these models have been trained to emphasize techniques that aim to mimic the way that humans think about questions. These newer, more powerful models have already been used with some incredible effectiveness to push forward frontier research in various fields.
To understand their impact, it’s helpful to clarify what AI-powered Large Language Models (LLMs) are and how they differ from the tools we’re used to like search engines. When you ask a question on Google, its algorithms go through pre-existing web data, ranking what it predicts will be the most relevant and retrieving accurate answers. In contrast, an LLM like OpenAI’s GPT-4 goes further. It doesn’t locate data; it processes language naturally, synthesizes information, and generates novel responses based on an enormous corpus of text it has been trained on.
For straightforward questions—like “What are the best date-night restaurants in Lakewood, NJ?”—the difference between Google and an LLM is marginal. Both can deliver helpful answers, though the LLM might do so with a cleaner interface and fewer ads. But when the task requires deeper textual analysis, LLMs really show their utility. It’s important to remember that LLM’S are not retrieving information when you ask them a question; they’re actively deciding on what the next best word or thought is to help you solve for your question, very much in the same way that having a friend help you reason through a question, models like o1, o1 Pro, or the newly unveiled o3 can be seen as almost a second brain at your fingertips and are phenomenal at working through hard problems.
It is this capacity, the capacity to reason that positions these models to transform how Gemara is learnt. As I’ll try to show here, reasoning-heavy AI models could become incredible partners in Gemara study, capable of engaging with complex sugyas at a level that mirrors—or exceeds—your smartest chavrusa in Yeshiva.
When I was in Yeshiva full time, I spent an inordinate amount of time on Lomdus (The Talmudic version of intellectualism). The Yeshivas I went to in Israel were known for their focus on learning Gemara B’Iyun (Talmud in depth). This meant that I spent countless hours poring over pages of hundred- and thousand-year-old Hebrew and Aramaic texts with my Chavrusa (study partner) trying to decipher the Gemara at it’s deepest level.
For the uninitiated, the pinnacle of the Yeshiva education is learning Gemara B’Iyun, it is widely regarded as the highest form of Torah study and before right now it would be almost impossible for someone that did not go through the “Yeshiva system” to do successfully. For starters, we are studying the Talmud, a 2,000-year-old Rabbinic text written in a Jewish Babylonian dialect of Aramaic that is essentially 5,000+ pages of fierce debate on Jewish Law, Ethics, and story/myth (Aggadah). Studying Gemara B’Iyun involves using the Talmud only as a starting point and then diving into a 2,000 + year expedition of Rabbinic commentary on the Talmud, trying to ascertain core conceptual frameworks underpinning the Talmud and/or fundamental disagreements between the Talmudic Sages. Getting to this level of learning usually involves an education that starts in the 3rd or 4th grade by learning Mishna and slowly working your way up to the Talmud itself, then some early Rishonim (first commentators), Achronim (later commentators), and then to the modern rabbinic commentators.
A recent sugya (topic) that we learnt in Yeshiva was that of the prohibition of carrying on Shabbos (Sabbath). Orthodox Jews have a slew of things that they don’t do on Shabbos, these prohibitions are connected to 39 fundamental categories that were done in the Mishkan (Precursor to the Temple). One of these categories is that of carrying or transferring an item from one domain to another. I asked OpenAI’s o1 model to help me walk through the Sugya of Hotza’ah (carrying), here was its response:
Below is a step-by-step overview of the opening sugya of Maseches Shabbos (primarily 2a–4a) that deals with the melachah (forbidden labor) of Hotza’ah—i.e., carrying from one domain to another on Shabbos. We will address:
Where the prohibition of carrying on Shabbos comes from
Why it is considered a melachah, even though it may not seem like a “creative act”
The structure of the Mishnah (“Yetzios haShabbos”), and how Chazal derive the details of this prohibition
1. The Torah Source and Definition of Hotza’ah
a. The 39 Melachos and Their Connection to the Mishkan
The Mishnah in Maseches Shabbos (73a) lists thirty-nine primary categories of forbidden labor on Shabbos. These thirty-nine (שלשים ותשע אבות מלאכה) all correspond to constructive activities performed in assembling or maintaining the Mishkan (Tabernacle) in the desert.
One of these thirty-nine melachos is הוצאה מרשות לרשות—“transferring an object from one domain to another,” usually shortened to “Hotza’ah.”
b. Why Carrying Is Forbidden
On the simplest level, the Torah explicitly singles out carrying as a prohibited labor on Shabbos (see e.g., Shemos 36:6 regarding not bringing further donations for the Mishkan on Shabbos, and Yirmiyahu 17:22 about carrying burdens out of one’s house on Shabbos).
Even though carrying might not look “creative” like plowing or baking, the Torah’s categorization makes it a full-fledged melachah. Chazal often call it a “מלאכה גרועה” (less obvious or “inferior” melachah), but it is nevertheless in the same halachic status as all the others.
c. The Core Act: Akirah and Hanachah
Hotza’ah is defined by two critical steps:
עקירה (Akirah) – Uprooting or picking up the item in the first domain
הנחה (Hanachah) – Placing it down in the second domain
Only when one person (or the same person) performs both the akirah and the hanachah, taking it from a private domain (רשות היחיד) into a public domain (רשות הרבים)—or vice versa—do we have a full biblical prohibition (an “Av Melachah”).
2. The Structure of the Opening Mishnah: “יְצִיאוֹת הַשַּׁבָּת”
The very first Mishnah in Maseches Shabbos (2a) begins:
יְצִיאוֹת הַשַּׁבָּת שְׁתַּיִם שֶׁהֵן אַרְבַּע בִּפְנִים וּשְׁתַּיִם שֶׁהֵן אַרְבַּע בַּחוּץ.
The “goings-out” (transfers) of Shabbos are two that are four (cases) inside, and two that are four (cases) outside.This cryptic statement introduces eight scenarios of transferring items between a private domain and a public domain. The Mishnah sets up a scenario with two main characters:
The בעל הבית (ba’al habayis) – The homeowner, standing inside (the private domain).
The עני (ani / “poor man”) – Standing outside (the public domain).
Chazal illustrate the laws of “partial” and “complete” Hotza’ah through four basic interactions. Each can be broken down into sub-cases, hence “two that are four.”
a. “Two That Are Four Inside” / “Two That Are Four Outside”
The poor man stretches his hand inside to place or remove an object.
The homeowner stretches his hand outside to place or remove an object.
Depending on who does the aakirah (lifting up) and who does the hanachah (putting down), we get different outcomes:
Full Biblical Violation (Chayav): One person does both the akirah and hanachah from one domain to the other.
Exempt but Rabbinically Prohibited (Patur Aval Asur): One person does only half the action (e.g., the poor man lifts it up, but the homeowner puts it down).
The Mishnah’s opening examples clarify these distinctions.
3. Walking Through the Mishnah’s Eight Cases
Case 1: Poor man extends his hand into the private domain, does akirah (picks up an item from inside) and removes it to the public domain (does the hanachah outside).
The poor man performed both akirah and hanachah → Chayav d’Oraysa (Torah-level prohibition).
The homeowner is not liable because he did nothing.
Case 2: Poor man extends his hand inside, homeowner places an object into his hand (so the homeowner did the akirah), and the poor man removes it outside (the poor man does hanachah).
Here two people collaborated: the homeowner does the akirah; the poor man does the hanachah.
Both are patur on a Torah level, because neither performed the entire act. However, Rabbinically it is forbidden (אסור).
Case 3: Poor man extends his hand inside and places it into the homeowner’s hand (the poor man does akirah), and the homeowner is considered as doing the hanachah by bringing it fully inside.
Collaboration again; each party did half. → Patur aval Asur.
Case 4: Poor man does both akirah from outside and hanachah inside (the reverse of case 1—now taking something from the public domain into the private domain). → Chayav.
Repeating a mirror set of four cases for the homeowner achieving or splitting the akirah and hanachah yields the total “two that are four inside, two that are four outside.”
Essentially, the Mishnah enumerates these scenarios to illustrate that full liability exists only if one person performs the entire act (akirah + hanachah) from one domain to another. If the act is split, each participant is patur from a Biblical standpoint but still אסור מדרבנן.
4. Why “Carrying” Is Considered a Full Melachah
a. Derived from the Mishkan
As noted, each melachah corresponds to a constructive act in the Mishkan. Indeed, the Jewish People would transport boards, curtains, dyes, or other materials from their tents (private domains) to the Levi’im’s communal area or to the site of the Mishkan (a different domain).
Because these transfers were essential, the Torah labels “carrying from domain to domain” as an Av Melachah in its own right.
b. “Melachah Geru’ah”—But Still an Av Melachah
The Gemara (Shabbos 96b and elsewhere) acknowledges that Hotza’ah might feel like a “weaker” melachah (מלאכה גרועה) because it doesn’t create or transform an object. Yet, it’s singled out in the Torah explicitly.
One way to think of it: the Torah wants Shabbos to be a day free from both creative work and commercial or logistic activity. Moving goods between domains is the essence of commerce and public work, so the Torah includes it among the forbidden categories.
c. Ramban’s Explanation
Ramban (on Vayikra 23:24 and in his commentary on the Torah) explains that the Torah deliberately highlights “carrying” to teach us that moving an object from place to place is also a “day-to-day labor” that disrupts the spirit of rest on Shabbos.
Although you are not actively shaping or transforming an item, you are transferring ownership or location in a way that was integral to the Mishkan—and integral to mundane weekday life—and thus the Torah forbids it.
5. Common Questions: “Why Isn’t Carrying a Ma’aseh?”
It is an action—albeit minimal.
True, carrying looks less like a “creative” act, but physically picking something up and placing it down in a new domain is indeed a complete action (when both akirah and hanachah are done by the same person).
Torah’s Definition of ‘Creative Work’
When we talk about “creative labor” (melachah), it is not purely about creating a new object; it is about mirroring the full scope of labor done for the Mishkan. The Torah defines “melachah” for Shabbos by example: “Anything that was necessary for the Mishkan’s construction or upkeep.”
Preventing Commerce and Errands
On a practical level, if carrying were permitted, one could do business, transport items in bulk, and effectively treat Shabbos like any weekday. Banning carrying safeguards the day’s sanctity and restfulness.
6. Brief Overview of the Gemara’s Initial Discussion (Shabbos 2a–4a)
After laying out the Mishnah’s “two that are four” cases, the Gemara discusses:
Why start Maseches Shabbos with Hotza’ah?
Various answers are given—among them: because it is an “inferior” melachah (מלאכה גרועה) that one might mistakenly belittle. The Tanna wants to emphasize it first.
Alternatively, it might be singled out in the Torah (as per the pasuk in Yirmiyahu 17).
Exact definitions of Akirah and Hanachah
How high is considered “akiras cheifetz” from the ground or from a surface? (Within 3 tefachim of the ground might be considered resting on the ground, etc.)
Placing it onto something that is stationary or in motion.
Patur Aval Asur
When the Mishnah says “patur,” it generally means “exempt from a Biblical punishment but still rabbinically prohibited.” This concept is explored thoroughly in the cases of partial carrying.
7. Practical Takeaway
The opening Mishnah and Gemara set the framework for all subsequent halachos of carrying on Shabbos.
Once we grasp that akirah + hanachah from one domain to another is the quintessential definition of Hotza’ah, we can then apply this knowledge to all halachic details: e.g., eruvin (how an eruv can transform a public area into a “shared private domain”), how we define public vs. private domains, and what is considered a “significant” lifting or placement.
Summary
Carrying (Hotza’ah) is explicitly listed among the 39 melachos because it was done in the Mishkan (transporting items between domains) and is explicitly forbidden by the Torah.
Even though it’s called a ‘melachah geru’ah,’ that doesn’t lessen its Biblical gravity—its “weaker” appearance is overshadowed by its fundamental role in the Mishkan and the Torah’s explicit singling it out.
The Mishnah’s opening cases of the poor man and the homeowner illustrate the technical requirements of a full violation: performing both akirah (lifting) and hanachah (placing) from one domain to another.
If the act is split between two people, it is “patur” from a d’Oraysa standpoint but still Rabbinically prohibited (patur aval asur).
Conceptually, the Torah wants us to desist not just from creative building but also from the transportation and commerce-like activities that define weekday life.
By studying these opening lines in Maseches Shabbos, one gains a foundational understanding of how the Sages analyze a seemingly simple act—carrying an object—and define it with precise halachic parameters. This sets the stage for the rest of the tractate, which deals extensively with the various domains, the laws of eruvin, and all aspects of Shabbos rest.
To me, this was pretty impressive, especially considering the fact that these models are trained for general use and were not in any way specifically trained on the Talmud. But I wanted to test its understanding further. One of the major issues with “Carrying” on Shabbos is that it is quite hard to understand why it is part of this grouping of 39 categories, all of the other categories seem to have a “creative element”, as in cooking or planting, but with carrying we are only moving the item from one domain to another, nothing seems to be happening to the item itself. Needless to say, I spent months on this one sticking point when we were learning this Sugya in Yeshiva, here is what the model responded to my request to help me understand this concept further:
Below is a more in-depth exploration of why Hotza’ah (carrying) is called a “מְלָאכָה גְּרוּעָה” (an “inferior” or “less obvious” melachah), and how the Rishonim and Acharonim grapple with this term and its meaning. We will focus on primary sources in the Gemara (particularly Shabbos 2a, 96b), commentaries such as Rashi and Tosafos, as well as discussions in Ramban, the Ran, and others.
1. The Term “Melachah Geru’ah” in the Gemara
Gemara Shabbos 96b famously refers to the melachah of Hotza’ah as “מלאכה גרועה.” The basic question is: Why single out carrying as “inferior” when it is fully listed among the 39 melachos?
Lack of Physical Transformation
Most melachos (e.g., baking, weaving, writing) actively transform the object. Carrying, however, merely changes the object’s location—no physical or qualitative change occurs to the object itself.Nevertheless an ‘Av Melachah’
Despite this “less creative” appearance, the Torah explicitly forbids carrying as one of the primary melachos (see Shemos 36:6, Yirmiyahu 17:22). The Mishkan required transferring materials between domains, so “Hotza’ah” is fundamental.2. Rashi: Emphasizing the Torah’s Singling Out
While Rashi (Shabbos 2b s.v. Yetzi’os HaShabbos; 96b s.v. Melachah Geru’ah) does not use a lengthy philosophical explanation, he points to two key points:
The Mishnah begins with Hotza’ah precisely because it may be undervalued—it seems “less creative,” so the Tanna wanted to highlight it right away.
It is singled out in the Torah—the prohibition against transporting items on Shabbos is written explicitly in more than one place (Shemos and Yirmiyahu), giving it a unique prominence despite it seeming “lesser.”
Rashi thus indicates that the term “geru’ah” means that one might not intuitively see the “creative” or “constructive” aspect. But from the Torah’s perspective, Hotza’ah is as weighty as any other melachah.
3. Tosafos: Why Call It “Inferior” if It Is Explicit?
Tosafos (Shabbos 2a, s.v. Yetzi’os HaShabbos) and elsewhere (96b, s.v. Kol HaPoshet) explore the “split action” aspect—Hotza’ah can easily be divided between two people (one does עֲקִירָה/akirah, the other does הֲנָחָה/hanachah), which leads to a patur (exempt) on a Biblical level. Tosafos point out:
Because it’s so easy to share the act and lose full culpability, the Gemara calls it “geru’ah”—it’s easy to think it’s not a real “complete” action.
“Geru’ah” also references the fact that it is not physically altering the item itself, in contrast to other melachos that transform matter.
Tosafos underline that “geru’ah” does not lessen its Biblical status—it only describes its nature of being less obviously creative than other melachos.
4. Ramban’s Perspective: Why the Torah Stresses It
a. Ramban on the Torah
Ramban (on Vayikra 23:24) famously discusses that Shabbos is not merely about refraining from “creative labor” but about refraining from any labor that was integral in the Mishkan or singled out by the Torah.
Even though Hotza’ah doesn’t transform an object, it was absolutely necessary for the Mishkan (transporting materials). Consequently, the Torah explicitly forbade it.
The Ramban also highlights that the Torah’s definition of melachah includes a broad range of “weekday-oriented” activities, not just physically creative tasks.
b. Ramban’s Emphasis on Public vs. Private Domain
In his commentary on Shemos, Ramban notes that carrying out from a private home to a public place is a hallmark of commercial or communal activity. Shabbos is meant to disrupt normal economic life; thus transferring items is singled out to preserve the day’s sanctity.
5. Ran and Other Rishonim: Observing the “No Visible Change” Factor
The Ran (on Rif, beginning of Shabbos) echoes a theme found in other Rishonim:
“Melachah Geru’ah” = No שינוי בחפץ (“no actual change in the object”): This is the simplest reason for calling it “inferior.”
Still a Melachah because the Torah says so: The Ran underscores that the classification of a melachah depends on the Torah’s linking it to the Mishkan-activities. It’s not about logic alone but about Divine decree.
Other Rishonim, like the Ritva and Meiri, make similar points when they comment on Shabbos 2a and 96b: They note that carrying is the ultimate test-case for Shabbos labor because it is so subtle—it’s the boundary case that might be overlooked if the Torah hadn’t been explicit.
6. Acharonim: Exploring Conceptual Dimensions
a. Minchas Chinuch
Minchas Chinuch (Mitzvah 32, 124, 244) discusses Hotza’ah as a “geru’ah” melachah in the sense that it lacks “מלאכת מחשבת”—there is no productive or tangible result to see. Yet the Minchas Chinuch explains that once the Torah singled it out and connected it to the Mishkan, that alone defines it as an Av Melachah with full gravity.
b. Chazon Ish
The Chazon Ish (Orach Chaim 49) broadens the idea: calling it “geru’ah” simply means it is easy to disregard, and people might not sense the “work” in it. But “work” in halachah is not subjective feeling—rather, it’s determined by halachic definition.
He also notes that carrying is the very melachah that, if permitted, would open the door to everyday commerce and traveling. Hence, the Torah ensures we treat it as a complete melachah.
c. Other Acharonim
Pri Megadim (Introduction to Hilchos Shabbos) and Mishnah Berurah (introduction to Hilchos Shabbos) likewise point out that Hotza’ah restricts the flow of goods on Shabbos, ensuring a day of rest from “weekday hustle.” This integral function, though “geru’ah” in physical transformation, is central to the spirit of Shabbos.
7. Three Core Reasons for “Geru’ah” Status
Putting these sources together, we can summarize three major reasons given by the Rishonim and Acharonim for why Hotza’ah is called “מלאכה גרועה”:
No Physical Change: Other melachos actively change or transform an object (e.g., cooking changes food, writing creates text). Carrying merely changes location.
Easily Split Action: Hotza’ah is uniquely prone to being performed by two individuals (one does akirah, the other hanachah), leading to patur on a Biblical level—making it feel “weaker” or “less complete.”
Viewed as “Commerce/Logistics” Rather Than “Creation”: From a “weekday life” perspective, carrying is more about transporting and commerce rather than creativity. The Torah needed to underscore that this too is forbidden labor on Shabbos.
Yet, the consistent refrain of all the Rishonim and Acharonim is that, despite its label as “inferior,” Hotza’ah is a \textit{full-fledged Av Melachah} and is just as severe as any other. It is “inferior” only in appearance or in the physical aspect of not altering the item, not in its halachic weight.
8. Conclusion
Hotza’ah is singled out: The Torah itself emphasizes carrying from domain to domain, tying it to halachos essential for preserving the restful, commerce-free spirit of Shabbos.
“Melachah Geru’ah”: The term highlights its lack of visible “creation” or transformation and its susceptibility to being split between two people.
Nonetheless, a full Av Melachah: All classical and later commentaries agree that the halachic status of Hotza’ah stands firmly as an Av melachah, punishable by the same standards as every other melachah.
This duality—the “inferior” look on the one hand and full severity on the other—makes Hotza’ah a paradigm for understanding that “creative labor” in halachah is defined first and foremost by the Torah’s association with the Mishkan, rather than by our intuitive sense of whether the act feels like “productive work.”
A great understaning! Again, the model has been trained to reason, and if we look under the hood we can see that it is literally walking us through the steps of how to understand these Talmudic complexities, Incredible.
Then I asked it to rope in the Rogatchover. R’ Yosef Rosen was arguably the most genius of all the recent Talmudic commentators. He is known for his almost unfathomably hard to understand Talmudic and Halachic theories and is not commonly learnt or understood by most Yeshiva students even in the most elite Yeshivos. Here is o1 explaining to us how he might understand the concept of Carrying on Shabbos:
Below is a broad-stroke presentation of how the Rogatchover Gaon (R. Yosef Rosen, 1858–1936) might illuminate the nature of Hotza’ah (carrying on Shabbos). While the Rogatchover’s works—chiefly his Tzafnas Pa’aneach on the Rambam—are famously terse and often require significant unpacking, his overarching conceptual approach can help us appreciate why “carrying” is a full-fledged melachah, despite being called a “melachah geru’ah” (an “inferior” or “less obvious” melachah).
Disclaimer: The Rogatchover rarely writes extensive, explicit treatises on individual topics. Instead, he scatters brief, cryptic notes throughout his writings, connecting many sugyos via underlying halachic principles. The summary below reflects themes that emerge from his methodology, particularly in Hilchos Shabbos.
1. Rogatchover’s Method: “Domain” as a Fundamental Halachic Concept
A hallmark of the Rogatchover’s method is his focus on the conceptual (halachic) status of an act rather than its physical manifestation. Many times, he looks for a single underlying principle that applies across different areas of halachah—such as changing an object’s “domain” (רשות) or halachic status.
In Hotza’ah (carrying), the Rogatchover views the critical element as “shinui reshus”—a legal transfer of domain—rather than mere physical movement.
From his perspective, the “Akirah” (lifting up in Domain A) and “Hanachah” (placing down in Domain B) effectively change the halachic domain of the object. That legal shift is what constitutes the forbidden melachah on Shabbos—akin to how, in monetary law, picking an object up can make a kinyan (act of acquisition).
Connection to Mishkan
He often highlights how, in the Mishkan, transporting materials from a private tent to the Levite’s station or vice versa was the precise “domain-transfer” the Torah forbade. The melachah is not about how “hard” the physical labor is, but how it redefines the item’s halachic standing.
2. Why This Explains “Melachah Geru’ah”
a. No Physical Change to the Cheifetz
One classic reason for calling Hotza’ah “geru’ah” is that there is no visible transformation. The Rogatchover’s approach sharpens this:
Physically: the item remains the same.
Legally: the object’s halachic “location” or “domain” has changed.
Thus, from a purely physical perspective, it looks “inferior.” But from a halachic vantage point, changing domain is a powerful act—no less “real” than writing letters or baking bread in terms of Shabbos law.
b. Transfer of Ownership or Reshut
Another feature that the Rogatchover might underscore is how Hotza’ah resembles a transfer of ownership. We see from many sugyos (e.g., Kiddushin, Gitin) that “giving” an item to someone involves the legal mechanism of נטילה and נתינה (taking and giving). Hotza’ah on Shabbos is effectively the same structure:
עֲקִירָה (Akirah) – The halachic “uprooting” of the item from Reshut HaYachid (private domain).
הֲנָחָה (Hanachah) – The halachic “placement” in Reshut HaRabim (public domain), thus finalizing the domain-change.
The Rogatchover often compares “moving an object to a new reshut” with other mitzvos or halachos that hinge on transferring domain—thereby demonstrating that the core halachic act of Hotza’ah is indeed a “meleches machsheves” (a halachically significant act of purposeful change), even if it’s “geru’ah” physically.
3. The Essence of the Prohibition: Act of Legal Transformation
Because the Rogatchover so often focuses on whether a change in legal status has occurred, he would say:
Carrying is singled out in the Torah precisely because it’s not about physically altering an object, but it alters the halachic status (reshut).
The “מלאכה גרועה” label means that if you looked at it from a purely creative standpoint—like building or weaving—you would miss the point. The Torah, however, defines any act in the Mishkan (including domain-transfer) as a melachah.
This line of thought underlies why splitting the act between two people (one does akirah, the other does hanachah) destroys the single legal transformation from one domain to another. Each person only does half an act, so the unified “shinui reshut” is never performed fully by a single actor—leading to “patur aval asur” (exempt from Biblical liability, yet Rabbinically forbidden).
4. Examples in Rogatchover’s Tzafnas Pa’aneach
While explicit, direct references on Hotza’ah can be sparse, a few patterns emerge from the Rogatchover’s Tzafnas Pa’aneach (on Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos) and his short teshuvos:
Domain-Change Parallels to Kinyanim: He often draws parallels between the Shabbos concept of lifting/putting down and the kinyan of משיכה (pulling an item into one’s possession) or הגבהה (lifting to effect acquisition).
Melachah Defined by the Torah’s Categories: The Rogatchover emphasizes that the 39 melachos are not limited to “physical artistry.” They are a system that the Torah established—so “carrying,” though physically minimal, is a complete halachic act if it replicates the Mishkan’s domain-transfer.
Comparisons to Acts of Giving and Receiving (נתינה): Some of his notes show how the Talmud’s opening cases (the poor man & homeowner) are basically acts of netina (giving) that finalize a reshut-change. The fact that the Talmud frames it as “the poor man extends his hand” highlights that we are dealing with a halachic transaction, not just the location of the object.
5. Summary of the Rogatchover’s Contribution
In a nutshell, the Rogatchover Gaon’s conceptual approach helps us see why carrying is a melachah—even though physically it is “geru’ah”:
Halachic Domain-Shift: The core of Hotza’ah is the legal transfer from one reshut to another.
Torah’s Definition of ‘Work’: The Torah sets “domain-change” as a quintessential melachah from the Mishkan. It is “inferior” to the naked eye (because it lacks physical creation) but equally potent in halachic terms.
Comparable to Monetary Transfers: The same logic that a kinyan is an act of acquisition applies here. A single actor must perform both “uprooting” and “placing” to complete the domain-shift and trigger Biblical liability.
Hence, what makes “carrying” a forbidden labor is not the “exertion” but the halachic transformation. The Rogatchover’s framework highlights the difference between the physical and the legal: physically, not much happens; legally, an entirely new status arises. This clarifies why, even if it is a מלאכה גרועה in appearance, Hotza’ah is as fully binding as any of the 39 categories of melachah on Shabbos.
My takeaways are this:
a. These models are world-class at understanding hard to access and domain-specific knowledge.
b. As is, these models can understand and explain complex Talmudic topics at a level just as good if not better than most individuals I encountered in my time in Yeshiva.
c. Once these models are specifically trained on Talmudic analysis there will not be a better oracle for Lomdus than it.
d. I think the bar for first time learners of Gemara has significantly dropped as anyone can now learn with an elite Chavrusa at their fingertips.
If we really are on the cusp of another revolution akin to the agricultural, scientific, and industrial revolutions of the past it will be fascinating to watch and see what the societal and cultural responses are from the traditional Jewish world.
Will we embrace the emergent technology or burrow further into the luddite version of our community that is unwilling to face the present and future of civilization?
AI was able to do the same thing you demonstrate a year ago. The future is interesting though.
I'm working on a piece that's coming at this topic from a less intense religious background, and pointing more generally to how well suited LLM's are for chavrusa more generally (the kind that fosters cross-textual insight, validation and/or challenging of ideas, etc.). I think the most important point--the one that is probably most broadly relevant--is that these models can provide immense scaffolding to understand what's in front of you as the learner (if not always accurate citations, which will certainly improve). And I'm looking forward to sharing how I think some of the aspects of true chavrusa--the kind of back and forth that makes Torah study a joy--can be integrated into LLM-based Torah learning experiences.